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I Introduction
Tlie extent to which acquisitive breaches of fiduciary obligation trigger a constructivetrust remains one of the most difficult and controversial issues in equin- and the law of
restitution. The cases are now in such a confused state that a decision of the Supreme Court
is necessary) When the opportunity arises the court will have to dial with the leading
authority of Boardman r Phipps.2 The case is known to generations of law students as the
leading case illustrating the harshness, even unfairness, of equity’s strict prophylactic duty
of fiduciary loyalty. 1-lowever, in recent years it has become as important, if not more so, in
the debate over the rote of the constructive trust in cases of wrongful fiduciary gain. As a
decision of the House of Lords, Boardmem cannot be ignored but precisely what it decides
has proved a difficult question to answer.
The main reason for the difficulty is that lack of clarity in the rcpotts of the case,
coupled with ambiguity in die judgments, has generated considerable confusion over
whether a constructive trust was in fact recognised or whether the defendants “-crc made
personally liable to pay the claimant the value of die net profit they derived from their
breach of fiduciary obligation. The difference is crucial given die far-teaching consequences
that flow from the recognition of a proprietary claim, This article resolves the confusion by
returning to the ptinted case papers submitted by die litigants to the House of Lords.3
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the trustees, although Ethel, who suffered from senile dementia, took no active role in the
trust affairs at the material time.
The residuary estate included 8000 shares in J.ester & Harris Ltd., an underperforming
private company with issued share capital of 3l),000 £1 ordinary shares. Boardman, the
trust’s solicitor and first defendant/appellant, and Tom Phipps, a trust beneficiary and
second deftndant/appellant, attended the company’s annual general meeting in December
1956 as representatives of the trust holding. Boardman sought information regarding the
company and attempted, unsuccessfully; to get Tom Phipps elected onto the board of
directors. Following the meeting, the defendants concluded that the best way to protect the
trust shareholding ‘vas to gain control of the company Nb Fox was keen tn see control of
the company in friendly hands but was of the firm opinion that the trust should not
purchase further shares ‘under any circumstances’.6 The terms of the trust, moreover, did
not permit it.7 The only way this legal impediment could be removed was by application to
the court to sanction the purchase of further shares. That “-as something a court “-as
unlikely to do)i either under its inherent emergency and salvage jurisdiction,9 or under the
powers conferred by s 57 of the Trustee Act 1925)° First, the trust was close to termination
since the residuary estate was dastnbutable to the remaining beneficiaries upon the death of
Ethel Phipps, whose health was deteriorating rapidh Second, the trust had no money
with which to make the investment)2 Third, the purchase of further shares in a poorly run
company is likely to have been considered speculative and imprudent)3 Boardman and
Tom Phipps therefore proposed to purchase further shares in the company with their own
funds and at their own risk.
There followed three stages of negotiations for the shares. Phase I took place between
January and April 1957, during which time Boardman made an offer to purchase Lester &
Harris shares at £3 per share. The offer was accepted by the holders of 2923 shares. Phase 2
ran from April 1957 to October 1958. During this phase of negotiations, in which it was
proposed to divide the assets of die company between the Phipps family and the other
principal shareholder group, Boardman obtained information about the factories of Lester
& 1-lards in Coventry and Nuneaton and its property in Australia. i-1e also obtained detailed
trading accounts of the English and Australian arms of the business. Throughout this phase
6 1196712 AC 46(1 1.) 73. -
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955 (CA; 956, where Cozensi lardy 1.1 described Re New as the ‘high u ater mark t,f the exercise by the court
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12 119671 2 AC 46 (HI.) 108—09 (Lord Hudson), 119 (Lord lTpioian)
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money after bad’: ibid 119. Similar views u-crc expressed be Viscount Dilhcarne and Lord Cohen: ibid 92, 103.
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These papers, which were not thought to have sun-ived,4 demonstrate that a constructive
trust u-as indeed recognised and underpinned the claimant’s recovers Flowever, ultimately
the claimant did not seek a transfer of the shares acquired in breach of fiduciary obliganon
but was content with a personal claim for the value nf the net profits made on the shares.
The printed case papers also facilitate a better understanding of the foundation of the
constructive trust that uas recognised. The orthodox view has long been that, if a
constructive trust was recognised in Boardmem, it must have been triggered by the mere
acquisition of gain in breach of fiduciary obligation. However, closer examination of the
case reveals that one of three additional elements arguably influenced the recognition of a
constructive trust: (1) a Ending that the gain was acquired by a fiduciary acting as an agent
for his principal; (2) a finding that the gain u-as obtained by exploiting trust property; or (3)
a finding that the gain derived from all opportunin’ of the claimant. Although it is now
possible to confirm that a constructive trust was recognised in Boardman the case cannot
therefore stand as authority for the broad principle for which it is commonly cited, nameh
that the mere acquisition of gain in breach of fiduciary obligation triggers a constructive
trust. In Bo:,rdmag at least something more was required. although what that ‘something’ was
did not receive a uniform answer.
2 Background
(A) THE SOLICITOR AND THE UNGRATEFUL BENEFICIARY
Thomas Gray I3oardman succeeded at most things. lie was the recipient of a Military Cross
for his part in an assault on a German stronghold during the Normandy landings in 1944.
i-Ic was a solicitor and successful businessman who served on the boards of numerous
companies, including the National Westminster Bank of which he was chair between 1983
and 1989. He u-as a Conservative Member of Parliament between 1967 and 1974, after
taking the previously safe Labour seat of Leicester South-West, and held tile offices of
Minister for industry (1972—1974) and Chief Secretary of the Treasury (1974) in the Heath
government. He was made a life peer in 1981) and ‘vas active iii the I-Louse of Lords until
shortly before his death iii 2003. Yet to many people, particularly law students, Tom
Boardman is kntawn as tile unfortunate solicitor of rile Phipps family trust, whose best
intentions put him on the wrong side of an ungrateful beneficiary and die harsh application
of equitable doctnne.
In the year that Boardman landed on die Normandy beaches die trust that was to cause
him so much trouble came into effect. Charles William Plupps died leaving his residuary
estate to provide an annuity for his wife, Ethel, for her life and thereafter to be distributed
five-eighteenths to each of his three sons (Richard, John and Torn) and three-eighteenths
to his daughter (Mrs Noble). Ethel Phipps, Mrs Noble and an accountant, Wilfred Fox, ‘vere
4 S:nd;zr Th:emeet (UKJ lid r I n.nEes 7tuk Fl’Lw,e lid th uimbcs:r:the rc-uers&p) l2OlOl LWI IC I 6 i4 (tb)
I 47j (I e,xion j) - It seems the papers hate nit stirv wed in the lii use ill I s,rd Purl hmez racy A rcliive. Ni I
apparently, have the tña documents ii, the Order of \\illserfisrre J survived In the archives t,f rise Kin alC. oiirts Of j usoce: It I Ci in:iglen, “thinking ahour Pr, ipderarv Re med es for B reach of Con fldcnce’ 20081 I82, 86.
5 I-or further details of ‘him Eloardman’ii bustness and polideal life, see ‘Ilciardmao’ in lbs ass IC?ss (online edn
OUP 2llOTh ii.rd Bi,ardnun’ The Thee; (london, 2 March 2iX13j 35; ‘Obireury of Lord lkiardman ‘hin’Minister Charged with Maitagims the Government’s Emergena’ Sic asurcs dunng the three Day Week’ TheDan, l’e2-rph (London, 12 March 2Q131 20; ‘Lord Boardman: Discrcc;lv R:ghring hsn Minister andNat\\isr Chief’ The 6mm/his (I ,ondtsn, 12 March 2003) 27 ‘lord Bciardman: Conservative Nitnister andChairman e,f NarWest’ The brdepesdesil (London, 12 Starch 2003) IS; ‘Boardman ru lord it at Nat \Xèse’ TheC:eanih:u (London, 27 January 1981) 20.
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Boardman represented to the chair of Lester & Harris, Mr Smith, that he was acting for thetrust. Phase 3 began in October 1958 “-hen Mr Smith informed Boardman he was preparedto sell his shares and to recommend to his associates they do likewise. This led to thepurchase of 14,567 shares by the defendants at £4 lOs per share, further 1194 shares werepurchised at the same price and 2925 shares were purchased pursuant to die earlier offer of£ per share. During this phase Ethel l’hipps died, at which point the residuary estate vestedabsolutely in the remaining beneficiaries under die will.
Having taken control, Boardman installed himself as chair of the company andliquidated its unprofirablc assets. This generated total capital dividends of £ l7s 6d pershare, £ per share being paid in 1960 following the sale of the Australian business arid £2ITs Gdper share being paid in 1961 following the sale of the Coventry factor’.
(B) THE RELIEF CLAIMED
Following the payment of the second capital distribution, Boardman approached theclaimant John Phipps, a beneficiary under the will and the brother of Tom Phipps, andoffered to purchase his shares in Lester & llarris. At this point John Phipps questioned thedefendants’ conduct and issued a vrit claiming
(I) a declaration that the defendants held five-eighteenths of the shares for him
as construcuve trustees;
(2) an account of profits made by the defendants on the shares; and
(3) an order that the defendants transfer to the claimant the shares held by them
as constructive trustees for the claimant and pay to the claimant five
eighteenths of the profit found to have been made by the defendants on thetaking of the account)3
\Vilberforce J, a unanimous Court of Appeal (Lord Denning MR, l’earson and Russell LI))and a bare majority of the House of Lords (Lords Cohen, Hodson and Guesç ViscountDilhorne and Lord Upjohn dtssentin held that Boardman and Tom l’hipps stood m afiduciary relationship to die trustt5 and had breached their fiduciary obligations)6 Theywere, accordingly, accountable.
3 The nature of the defendants’ accountability
(A) SOURCES OF REMEDIAL CONFUSION
Much of the disagreement over the nature of the relief ordered in Ho,rdmmn can be tracedto differing reports of the trial Order and the seemingly inconsistent language used in thevarious judgments. The All England Reports state that \Vilberforce J made an Order ‘fiarthe declaration sought by para (i) of the claim in the statement of claim (viz, a declarationof the constructive trusteeship .
. .) and for an account of profits as claimed in para (ii) ofthe claim in the statement of claim’.17
11 \Vrir dared I March 1962; amended statement tiE claim I B jols 1963, claims I—i The rebel claimed is reportedaccurately in both trial reports: ll9641 2 All ER 187 (Gb) 180; 119641 I \\l.R 993 (Gb) 1005IS There u as no consensus as :u Fe underl ing ft,undatit,n of the defeodants’ fiduciary pcisitions see belownn 84—89 ad accompanying text.
16 [here is a similar lack of cimsetisus regarding the aspect of the fiduciary obligation of loyalty that was breachedhr the defendants Some thought there had been a breach of the no-profit rule while others rhouch: both theno-profit and the no-conflict rules had been breached ‘Ihe nt,et,nfltr: aspeer was not pleaded ar trial butintroduced by Lord Dentring MR is, rhe ILt,urm of Appeal, almost as an afterthought: II 9651 Ch 992 (GA) 1020.17 1196412 All ER 187 (Ch) 2118
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There is no considered discussion of the Order in the appeals. However, Lord Justice
Pearson,18 Lord Cohe&9 and Lord Guest20 each referred to the Order as declaring the
defendants held five-eighteenths of the shares ‘as constructive trustees’ and were
accountable on that basis. Moreover, the defendants “-crc characterised as ‘constructive
trustees on three occasions in the House of Lords
— once by Lord Flodson21 and twice by
Lord Guest. The Lester & Harris shares, said the latter:
are the shares of which the courts below have held the appellants to be
constructive trustees and in respect of which as to 5/18th5 the appellants ate
accountable to the respondent for the proflts ansing from such purchase. The
question, and die univ question before this House, is whether the appellants are
constructive rrusrees of these shares.
Having considered the facts and surveyed the la; Lord Guest expressed ‘no hesitation in
coming to the conclusion that the appeHants hold the Lester & Harris shares as constructive
trustees and are bound to account’.2’
On the other hand, the report in the \XckIv Law Reports does not state that a
constructive trust was declared, Rather, it reports that \VilberforceJ declared the defendants
‘were accountable’ with ‘[qurther consideration of Order to transfer the shares held by diedefendants nd payment of profit found on taking of the account adjourned’.24 In the
absence of further consideration of the transfer of the shares during the rest of the
litigation, and in the absence of any evidence that the shares were in fact transferred, this
might be taken to imply that no constructive trust was recognised.
Some judgments in &ardman also contain references to the defendants’ liabilin to
account for profits rather than their llabihn to account for the shares or ‘as constructive
trustees’. Thus, at trial \Vilberforcej stated that the question for determination ‘vas whether
the defendants were fiduciaries ‘so as to be accountable to the trust for any prot which
they made’.2’ in the House of Lords, Lord Hodson expressed ‘the proposinon of law
involved’ in the case in similar terms2’ while Lord Cohen concluded that the claimant was
fortunate ‘in that the rigor of equity enables him to participate in the profits’27 and dint each
appellant is ‘accountable to the respondent for his share of the srt profits they derived from
the transaction’.28 Indeed, a passage in the judgment of lord Denning MR in the Court of
Appeal suggests that payment of the defendants’ net profits rather than the transfer of the
shares was sought by the claimant:
11)651 Ch 992 (CA) 1021.
[1067) 2 AC 46 (I-IL) 99.
Ibid 112.
ibid 105.
Ibid 114.
hid I 17. I ord Lp;tshn, dissenting, also formulated the defeudints lolathi in terms of constructive
trusreeslup but could ‘see notching to make them constructive trustees’: ibid 129—30.
11964] I ‘X IR 993 (CIa) 14)18. The Order of ‘Xtlberfotrcej is similarly reported in the report of each appeal
in the i.aw Reports: 119651 Ch 992 (Ct) 993. 1007; 119671 2 AC 46 ([IL) 46, 47, 61
(I61( I \\i.it 993 (Cr.) 04)6. see also 1019.
(1967] 2 AC 46 ([II) 05.
ibid 104.
Ibid (emphasis added). Hut compare Lord C,,Iaen’s earlier formulation of the issue for determinari,,n which
he identified as whether thc defendants were ‘in such a fiduciary relaoonslaip £3Sol tie the trustees that they
must bc taken to be accountable to rite beneficiaries for i/se s/sans md [Cr 5,0 profit tirth-ed bj them therefrone’: ibid100 (erzphasts added).
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the plaintiff [claims the defendantsl ought not to be allowed to retain the profit (leyhair made on the shares and ought to account for it to the estate and that he, theplaintiff, should have his 5/ISths. i-Ic does not suggest mv dishonesty or badfaith on their part. i-ic simply says that in the circumstances they are thvoiaitaNeJbrthe profit He acknowledges that they have done a lot of hard work and are enutiedto full and generous remunerataon for what they have done; but he says thej shouldnot take the a hole of thes /aee pm]itjor the,usehrx.”
It is also notable that the principle of Regal (Hastings) i Czdhii’er3 was influential andconsidered disposidve of the case by WUherforceJ’ Pearson 14,32 and the members of themaotin- in the House of Lords.33 In Regeil the directors were personaflv liable to thecompany for profits made on the sale of shares in a subsidiar3; the shares having beenacquired by the directors in breach of fiduciary obligation, notwithstanding chat thecompany itself was financially disabled from purchasing the shares. Lord Porter was clearthat the shares themselves never became the property of the company34 while l.ord Wrightreferred favourably to lister & & v Stubh?’ as authorin for the proposition that therelationship benveen principal and fiduciary in secret profit cases ‘is that of debtor andcreditor, not trustee and eestui qece Inn?.36 The cases, he said in a passage quoted by LordCohen in Boardman,’7 establish the general role that ‘an agent must account for net profitssecretly
.. acquired by him in the course of his agency’.3 Reliance on Rtgee/bv the majorinin Boardman is therefore arguabh inconsistent with the recogninon of a constructive trusttriggered by the simple appearance uf gain acquired in breach of fiduciary obligation.
(B) THREE INTERPRETATIONS
The lack of remedial clarity in &ardmcm has generated three competing interpretations ofthe case.
0) Broad proprietary constwcthe trust principle
The first interpretatitrn is premised on the assumption that the defendants were declaredconstructve trustees of the shares for the claimant. It is assumed to follow that, since tiledefendants acted honestly and caused tile trust no loss (indeed, the trust benefitted fromthe defendants’ actions), the mere appearance of gain acquired in breach of fiduciaryobligation must be sufficient to tngger a constructive trust. Thus, in Sinclair EIo/dnigs iA rerseu7%s Trade Hnance,-39 lbmer j, as he then was, agreed that Boar/mien demonstrates:
unauthorised pro fits acquired by a fidticniry in breach of his fiduciary duty are (ifidentifiable) held by the fiduciary upon a constructIve trust for the person towhom the fiduciary duty is owed, who thereby obtains an immediale proprietaryInterest in them.40
2’) 1i9631 f] 992 (LA) 1016 (cmphass added).
30 1194211 All FIt 378 (III.), reproduced 119671 2 AL 134n.
31 19631 \X].R 993 (Cli) 101(1—12.
32 (9651 Lb 992 (LA) 1022 (l’carsin lj). Sec also the briefer references to the case iv lord Denoing: ibid 1019.33 1196712 AC 46(1W) 03 (lord Cohen), 1118—09 (lord 1-lodson), I i7 (lord Guest).33 Reil (n 30) 395.
35 (18911) 45 Lb I) I (IA)
36 Rr&zt(n 30) 393,
37 119671 2 AC 46 (Fl!.) iO —02.
38 Reqil (a 31)) 392.
39 (2007j EWIIC 915 (Ch).
40 Ibid 11051.
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Similark; in rltiornej Genera/for Hon,g Kong z’ Reid, the [5tin Council considered that Boardman
demonstrates ‘die extent to which equity is willing to impose a construcuve trust on
property obtained liv a fiduciary by -frrne of his office’.4’ The remedial principle of
&ardman is therefore broad and simple: the acquisition nf gain in breach of fiduciary
obligation is sufficient tn trigger a constructive trust.42
(ii) Purely personal relief
The second interpreranon of Boardman rejects the claim that a constructive trust was
recognised- Rather, it IS argued that &ardman involved nothing more than the recognition
of a purely personal claim to flve-eighteenths of the value of the net profits derived by the
defendants from the purchase of the shares. The defendants were not, and were never
declared to be, proprietary constructive trustees of the shares.43
Those pressing this interpretation focus on the report of the Order in the \\iek[v Law
Reports, noting that nothing in ‘die words of the court’s order contain die least indication of
a proprietary liability’.34 They also argue it is important not to place ‘too much reliance . . on
the mere language of constructive trusteeship’.4’ Not only do die speeches in the [louse of
Lords ‘collectively blur the distinction’46 benveen personal liabilin- to account and
constructive trusteeship, but the language of constructive trusteeship does not of itself
indicate ant’ concrete conclusion. For these reasons, it is said, Boardwan is best interpreted ‘only
as authority for personal liabiin- and nor as one invoking a proprietan- construcrne trust’.4
(ill) Dedandon of proprietary consflcthe Uusteeship possible but irrelevant
In recent years those anxious to limit the reach of proprietary claims have provided a third
interpretation of Boardman. They accept that some aspects of die case have a ‘proprietary
flavour’ and may indicate a constructive trust \vas formally recognised. 1-lowever, they
dismiss a proprietary claim as unnecessary and irrelevant. Thus, it is said that, while the
vie’vs of reasonable people ‘may differ about whether the remedy awarded as or “-as
not proprietary’,48 the point was never argued and ‘apparently did not matter’.49 Most
notably, there is nothing to suggest that the shares were transferred to the claimant and
4’ I I AC 324 (PC) 333 (he New Zealand Curt of Appeal had been much more cannons, noting that
while l3oanimas: met Iced the rccngnitii sfl of a ctinstrucflvc trust ‘it wi suld be a mistake to assume that by a side
wind their l.ordslstps - - - intended t IVe rrule Liner & Co e ShsbW: .‘li.’orng Censor//sr (long Kong p I I 99212 NZLR 385, 391
[ii r similar tic rpre ta tis ‘as of aavthv,n see Fmr I,:s6.: Form.-,!: 0,:, Term L’d .t life;:.: it:vg Teas’s Sds: BA?
120121 IuWIIL 616 (Ch), 120121 ltPC 29 13761 (Arno!dj); Dysrs: Thhnofsgy L’dr Gino 120101 flWflt 3239 (Cli)
l1331—l1371 (Grant j(; Ck:nios in:ernnona/ L’d p P117-I Gm Lid 120081 EWI IC 1494 (Ch) l°l judgc PutieQO D 5tH r,( ii 9ju1 2001 tldil lli ‘i tlitrtsin I \ea I, sri : (is: r ( h 1
I9B) l220l—l221l (Litdseyj) Car,’a,, p FL:/eszrep (1Q83) 4 15CC 338 (1 h) 540 (Mornstj); is/ama lkoesbÜc of Ira”
.S/apamg Lines is Desthj 119871 I Lloyd’s Rep 367 (QIS) 371 (leggatt j); Norma/ce U/v Bthis,, 119831 FSR 3(8(Ch) 322 QC(idts:n j). The final case is particularly interesting as a derision of Str Raymond \tilton QC. who
appeared as lead rounsel for the claimant itt Bear/man.
U/lnfh:me (LIK,) U/v Fe/ding 120031 E\\I K.: 1633 (Cli), 120061 lSR 17 15161 Q.cnissin J).
P11 Il lurks, ‘Personal Restitution in (Equity’ [198311 SICI.Q 128, 133.
D Ctillrv. Case t,f I’rssptie:ar; Overkill’ II °l RUt 57, 61.
Ibid.
D FIaron. ‘Developing die lawof Iruses fnrtheluscnn-FirstCrnrur’ (19913) 106 l.QR 87, 11)1 ).lore recently,
Professor I (at-ton has aogted that &ordo-.:,: should tic snterprett-d as acme rccognts:ng a pruptictan constructive
trust D I-layton, ‘No I’ropdctan- l.iabibtv fist Bribes and Other SecreT Profits?’ (2011) 25 1St I.] 3.
Sine/air (n 4) ll
Ibid ll Lord Ncobcrgcr MR expressed agreetnent with this psont on appeal: Sb,ehdriss,nhnrnl (UK,)
Udv I ‘crsai//es ms/c F/sante Lid (in A/mis:is/rathr Rccci:YnAib) 120111 LWC:A Civ 347, 120121 Ch 153 170]
42
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there was no risk that the defendants were or might become bankrupt thereby limiting the
value of a personal claim. This, it is said, explains the lack of clarity on the constructive trustpoint it ‘vas not the subject of debate or considered observation because nothing turned
on its recognition or absence. If recognised, the constructive crust was but a convenient
mechanism for reaching an outcome identical to one which could have been reached
without a constructive trtist Since nothing turned on die point, Beardman has little
authoritative value on the issue of constructive trusts.
4 What was ordered?
(A) THE ORDER OF WILBERFORCE J AND ITS TREATMENT IN THE APPEALS
The second interpretation, that a purely personal claim was ordered but there was noproprietary constructive trusteeship. can be discounted immedLatek The Order of Mrjustice Wilberforce dated 25 March 1964, a copy of which is included in the House of1.ords printed case papers, states:
THIS COURT DOTH DECLARE that the Defendants Thomas Grayl3oardman and Thomas Edward Phipps hold five eiuliteenths of the 2I.986Ordinary Shares of £1 each in Lester & 1-jams Limited mentioned in theStatement of Claim as constructive trustees for the Plaintiff
AND THIS COURT DOTFI ORDER that the following account and inquiry hetaken and made that is to say
(1) An Account of the profits come to the hands of the Defendants Thomas GrayBoardman and Thomas Edward Phipps and each of diem from the said shares
and
(2) An inquiry what stim is proper to be allowed to the Defendants Thomas GrayBc,ardman and Thomas Edward Phipps or either of them in respect of their orhis work and skill in obtaining tile said shares and the said profits in respectthereof
AND fl IS (JRDIERED that no proceedings be taken on the said Account or
on the said Inquiry until after the exptr of the jtime ltmitj for serving notice
of appeal from this Order and if notice of appeal is served ‘vitlun such periodthen until after the dispos il of the said appeal.
AM) IT IS ORDERED chat the Defendants Thomas Gray Boardman andthomas Edward Phipps do pay the Plaintiff his costs of this .\ctit,n
THE further consideration of tins Action is adjoutned,
No proceedings were taken on the Account or the Inquin- since the defendants issuednotice to appeal to the Court of Appeal, within the prescribed time limit, on 2 july 1964,and sought to have the Order set aside. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal anddeclared that ‘the said Order dated 25Ih March 1964 be affirmed’?0 The defendantsappealed this Order to the House of lords. Both the Order of \Vilberforcej and the Orderof the Court of Appeal were submitted to the 1-louse as part of the printed case. The onlyquestion for determination by tile I-louse, she appellants submItted. ‘vas ‘whether the
-\ppellants are accountable to the Respondent as constructive trustees of cettain shares inLester & Harris Limited which ‘vere purchased by them’.’1
It is therefore clear that the defendants formally were declared constructive trustees offive-eighteenths of the shares and that this declaration was affirmed in successive appeals.
50 Order of the Court of Appcal, 26 january 965.
5 I Case for the apptllao:s, pan 2.
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The report of the Order in the \Veeklv Law Reports is misleading since it omits reference to
the declaration of the constructive trusteeship as sought in paragraph one of the Statement
of Claim, stating simply that the defendants were ‘accountable’. However, it reports that
consideration of the relief claimed in paragraph three of the Claims, which included the
transfer of the shares, was adjourned. This creates the impression that no decision “-as
reached on the defendants’ constructive trusteeship. We can now be sure that it was.
(B) THE NATURE OF THE DEFENDANTS’ CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTEESHIP
Although it is clear the defendants were declared constructive trustees of the shares in the
Order of WilberforceJ, and the Order was affirmed in the successive appeals, nvo questions
remain. First. were the defendants decLlredpr9pt*tczry constructive trustees of the shares in
the Order? Secondly, if the defendants n-err declazed proprietary construcuve trtistees of the
shares ‘vas the proprietary nature of the constructive trusteeship recognised u-hen the
Order u-as affirmed in the succcssive appeals? The mere use of the language of constructive
trusteeship is indeterminate since it may carry one of tu-o meaning. In its more usual sense
‘constructive trustee’ denotes a person who holds idennflable property on constructive trust
for another person who holds an equitable proprietary interest in the propern- subject to
the constructive trust. However, the language of constructive trusteeship may also function
as ‘a formula for equitable relief to denote simply that a defendant who is not a trustee in
the strict sense is to be treated for a particular purpose ‘as though he vere’.’2 When
employed in this latter sense ‘constructive trusteeship’ does not describe a proptietar
relationship?3
The wording of the Order of \Vilberforce j points to proprietary constructive
trusteeship: the defendants, it was declared, i1old the shares as constructive trustees.
Moreover, the Order was framed to grant that which the claimant sought. The complaint
vas that the defendants ‘failed or refused to transfer to the Plaintiff 5/l8ths of the shares
in the Company purchased by them or to account to the Plaintiff for 5/I 8ths of the
profit made by them on such The claimant therefore sought a decLaration of
constructive trusteeship of five-eighteenths of the shares as a means of obtaining a transfer
of the shares and payment of the profits made thereon in the inretim. Wilberforcej granted
the declaration of constructive trusteeship and ordered an account be taken. The order to
transfer the shares and pay over the profit vas, however, held over until after the account
had been taken and an inquiry made as to a proper sum to be awarded to the defendants
for their uork and skill since both the account and inquiry affected the terms on which the
shares would he transferred.
There is nothing to suggest that the members of the Court of Sppeal were not clear
that they were affirming the defendants’ proprietary constructive trusteeship. However, an
the House of Lords, Lord Hudson appeared to employ constructive trusteeship not in its
proprietary sense but as a formula for recognising that the defendants were accountable as
if they themselves were trustees. The defendants, he said, ‘are not trustees in the strict sense
but are said to be constructive trustees by reason of the flducian- position in uhich they
stood’.55 Drawing upon Dances r Addy he went on to note the circumstances in which the
52 Se/atigor [‘ni/eel Rj,hberEa5#es lid,’ &adock (2s 3) 11968l I \%LR 1555 (Cli) 1582 (Ungocd-Thomasj).
53 lb us, IL is said that a cons trucove trust may ‘create or ten Ignise no prc pat tary in erect’: Chime/li Cnm.’nQi
(1999) 161 AIR 173 (lIC:\) 475. See also lls/dea/sehe Lmdesbank Gascentre/ce Isling/on LBC [19961 AC 669
(III.) 705 (Lord Brtrnte-WHkinssin); t. Smith, ‘Constructive irust and Constructive irusices’ 1I°l 1Lj 294,
299—300.
54 Amended statement of claim. IS Jolt 1963, pata 23.
55 119671 2 AC 4(1 ([IL) 11)5.
—
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responsibilities of a trustee ‘may be extended in equity to others who arc nor properItrustees’.’6 having concluded the defendants had acted openly and honestly in the instantcase he observed that ‘[i}f however, they are in a Liduciar3- position they are es inn/en boundIw’ the duty not to place themselves in a position of conflict with the trust57 liedefendants’ ‘constructive trusteeship’ therefore took its meaning from its contrast withtrusteeship in the strict sense as an expression of liability to the trtrustees the defendants “-crc treated as if Mg litre and \ve there
Ust. Though nut strictly
fore accountable if theyplaced themselves in a position in which theft personal interests conuicted with die interestsof die trust.
However, such reasoning does not necessarily preclude the recognition of a proprietaryclaim. It tells us simply that the defendants were to be treated in the same way as if they wereprofiting trustees. It also must have been clear from the submissions of both parties thatproprietary constructive trusteeship of die shares was at stake As noted alreadt; theclaimant’s complaint was diat shares which belonged to him in equi had nor beentransferred to him by the defendants. The quesuon to be determined by die f-louse, saidcounsel for the defendants, “-as ‘were the circumstances such that th consciences of theappellants were so affected that under the principles of equity diat which in law is theftprnpern- must nevertheless be held by diem for the benefitCunsequenth; it is difficult to see how Lord Hodson or any other
of the respondent?’58
member of die Housecould ‘jew die constructive trusteeslup in die Order of \Vilberforcej in anything other thanproprietary terms.
5 Was proprietary constructive trusteeship a live Issue?
\Xiat, then, of the third interpretation of &ardman that. regardless of whether aconstrucove trust formally was declared, its recognition was not a live issue arid ‘simply didtint matter’?59 This claim is based largely on the absence of any evidence that die disputedshares were in fact transferred to the claimam.°0
It is indeed correct that die litigation did nor result in a transfer of any shares to theclaimant. After the I-louse of Lords dismissed the appeal die chaimanshares transferred to him. Boardmao retained all of his shares and
t did nor seek to have die
emained chair of Lester& I-lards until the demands of a ministerial role in the [heath go’.ertam required him U)relinquish the role!1 Moreover, long before die end of the litigation (and perhaps even at thethai stage), it was clear that a transfer of the shares was not in die claini;mt interests. First,the shares were worth roughly half of die amount diat the defendants had paid for them. Indiese circumstances it was unlikely the claimant would have wanted to pay die counter-restitution necessan’ to secure the transfer of the shares, The Cost of the counter-restiwdcjnin all likelihood could not have been met fully from the dividend profits after die deductionof an allowance for the defendants’ dine and skill.62 Had the claimant wanted the shares he
56 19671 2 AC 16 ([II.) 11)5, qLsonu)g Ban:,; :.-ldd; (1874; 9 Cli
.‘pp 244 (C.\; 251 I-ord lb,-t’ icy57 119671 2 .\C 16 (III.) 11)5—06.
58 Ibid 61.
59 f,du (n 4) ll
6(1 Sec e.g. ibid Il
61 Email from N gel Hi ,ardman to the audi, Sr (6 januan’ 20 I 2.. Niutl ISoa,tlman aof ‘I’homz. Bsnrdman. On Thomas lSi,ardman’s n,,o,slL-na) roles, tee n 5 ahoy Pracosing ssilinnw, is the sonand aeclsnipanvia,g [cxi,62 ‘l’he cost of five-eighrceoths of each ol rile thrce parcels of shares amounted to £28,766 while the grosscapital distributions received by [lie defendants on the same prclportiisn of the share, amounted to £33,885Iliac-ever. ihe all.suar.ce that ‘i5 to Sw deducted for thu defendant? skt3 and ucirk was to he assessed !iberallvand may have bet-n as much as 60 per cent of the nut prolit: Email from c(6 january 2012). Mr Bisaidmans recollection if this aspect of the case is, him llila,Lman us the auth,;rever, admjty hazy
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would have been required to dip into his own pocket to meet some of the cost of the counter
restitution. Secondh-, die claimant, a farmer with little understanding of commercial matters,
had never taken an interest in the family businesses and was simply ‘concerned to get his share
of the estatehfo Talk of the recovery of profits dominates in the judgments because the
defendants’ profits, rather than the shares, are what the cLiimant wanted.
It is, however, arguable that \Vilberforce Js declaration of constructive trusteeship was
more than mere window-dressing for a purely personal claim for net profits. An underlying
proprietary claim to the shares may have been considered necessary to the identification and
quantification of the net profit for which the defendants were personally liable!ldiough
the shares were worth less than the amount that the defendants had paid for them, their
purchase was profitable since the fall in share value was more than offset by the capital
dividends received on the shares in january 1960 and June 1961 and the ordinary dividends
received on the shares in the years since their purchase in I939f’ An underlying proprietary
claim to the shares may have been considered necessary in order to capture some or all of
these gains.
The problem with founding a personal claim to the profits directly on the underlying
breach of fiduciary obligation is that claims to profits derived from wrongdoing are subject
to cut-off points. This is the so-called ‘remoteness of gain’ issue. According to lurks’
formulation gains consequential upon the ‘first non-subtractive receipt’ generally are
considered too remote from the wrong to be recoverable.6’ This suggests that in Bcs,rdmaoz a
claim resting solely On breach of fiduciary obligation would not have allnwed recovery of the
capital dividends or the ordinary dividends since these were pins consequential upon the
first non-subtractive receipt
— the purchase of the shares in breach of fiduciary obligation.
The limits of remoteness of gain are not, however, clear and more recently less
restrictive approaches have been preferredf’6 Virgo, for example, notes that in the context
of breaches of fiduciary obligation there is some evidence that the remoteness of gain
principle is weaker and fiduciaries maybe compelled to account for gains derived indirectly
as ‘veil as directly from the breach.6’ A weaker approach to remoteness is also more
consistent with equth’s strict policy of deterring breaches of fiducian obligation. Applying
this approach it is probable that the capital disrributions in Boxirdwan would nor have been
considered too remote from the breach of fiduciary obligation. The liquidation of
unprofitable company assets was after all an expected source of profit and indeed motivated
the breach of fiduciary obligation complained of. But it is more difficult to make a similar
argument for the recovery of at least some of die ordinary dividends paid on die shares
berxeen 1960 and 1966, particulatlv those paid in the later years. Personal Ititbiliry for gains
made on the shares could not go on indefinitely; there had to be some cut-off point.
Such difficult questions would not need to be addressed if the shares in Boardman \vere
held on proprietary constructive trust from the moment they were acquired by the
defendants in breach of fiduciary obligation. In that case, since the shares vere trust
property, the defendants would be accountable for both the capital and ordinary dividends
received thereon. The dividends would be die fruit of die trust property and therefore held
63 119611 I WLR 993 (Clii 1016, t017; 119651 Ch 992 (CAl 995. 1016.
63 [he reports are si!cti: as to urdtharv dividends but it is rica: mn were rereiveit on the shares and itsegh: by
the dainunt: amended statement of rSims, IS July 1963. pari 2!.
65 P B turks, -In Intmdntaoq to the bits of Rnüagzoso (tevd edn (]arendusn 1989) 351—55.
66 See e.g. -‘ Burrows, The Ln’ Rntituhen(2nd rdn Butterxesrths Lens Nexis 2002) 500—0); K Barker,
Riddles, Remedies and Resnnzdon: Quantifying Gain in Unjust Enrichment taw’ (21)01) 54 CLI’ 255.
67 0 Virgo, ‘Restitudonan Remedies fur \‘(rongs: Causation and Remoteness’ in C E F Rickeet (ed), Jest/fl /ng
Pr/rote Low Romeo/irs (I-Ion 2008) 301, 321—23.
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on the same trust as the asset that produced them. The constructive trust route would thus
have allowed the claimant to circumvent the remoteness problem because there is no cut
off point for profits deti-ed from trust propern-.
A non-proprietary route (founding the claim directly on the breach of fiduciary
obligation) as well as a proprietary route to tile profits was mooted by die claimant in the
statement of claims68 but, given the obvious difficulty with the former, the latter
underpinned the claimant’s case. It also formed the basis for the account in the trial Order
which ordered, without limitation, that the defendants were liable to account for any profit
found to have come into their hands from the shares.
6 Agency gain as the constructive trust trigger
(A) WILSERFORCE J’s AGENCY REASONING
This leads naturally to the quesbon of the constructive trust trigger in Boardman. Given that
a constructive trust was likely to have been viewed as a live issue in Roan/man, does this lead
to the conclusion that the first interpretation of the case is correct, namely, that it standsfor the proposition that the mere appearance of gain acquired in breach of fiduciary
obligation is sufficient to trigger a constructive trust? As the remainder of this articledemonstrates, it is unsafe to reduce the remedial aspect of Roan/man to such a simpleproposition. lii this section we see that the trigger For the constructive trusteeship in the
trial Order is nor as clear as is often supposed since Wilberforce 3 identified an additional
element, beyond the simple appearance of gain, which may have provided an accepted
narrower foundation for the recognition of a constructive trust.
A key issue at thai was whether the defendants occupied a fiduciary position since theydid not fall intt, an established category of fiduciary relationship. Both defendants attended
the annual general meeting of Lester & 1-lartis on behalf of the trust and attempted to getTom Phipps elected as a director of the company. These acts were undertaken to protect
the trust shareholding. The claimant argued that the defendants “-crc therefore agents of
the trustees and, as such, subject to fiduciary obligations. Thu difficuln- with this analysis is
there was no contract of agency berveen the defendants and the trustees.69 Wilberforcu Jnevertheless drew upon the agency concept to establish that the defendants ‘assumed tile
character of se//appointed agents for the trustees, for the purpose of extracting information
as to tile companvs business from its dtrectots’ and ‘to strengthen the management of die
company by securing representaflon on rue hoard of the trust holding’.7° Information usedby Boardman during his successful negotiations for the shares ‘vas acquired while acting in
the course of such agency liv tnakirig profitable use of information acquired in the
execution of his fiduciary office, Boardman was accountable under the no-profit principle.
I however, Wilberforce J also appears to have accepted that the negotiations for the
shares, or some of them at least, were undertaken by the defendants for the trust. I-havingidentified that die purpose of the ‘self-appointed agency’ was to extract information about
the company and to secure trust representation on the hoard, Wilberforce j added that there
was also an intention that the defendants ‘should acquire additional shares xvith a view to
68 Amended statement of ciaim, 18 July i 963, plea 20.
69 [here s-ure tux, reasons ti r this. I irs t, in order to bind the trust all iii tee trustees untild have is, join hi hr
contracr and it was quite clear that I ihL-I iahinps did nor authnhse ansiltmg. Secondly, there was anyway nointendon tin the parr of 5tr Fox and Mrs Noble to rmplo the defendants as agents: (i96l 2 XC 16 (111) i(kl(Lord c:,heis), 119651 Ch 992 (CA) 11)17 (Lord Denning Mit).
70 19641 t WLR 993 (Ch) 1007 (emphasis added).
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obtaining control. This “-as no departure from the agenc’71 Thus, the defendants’ initial
offer for the shares in 1957, which led to the purchase of 2925 shares, was considered a
trust action undertaken by the defendants as agents of die trustees. Evidence of this was
found in the letter of offer which represented that the defendants acted for die trust
holding. Similar representations were made to the chair of Lester & I-lards, who thought
Boardman was acting as ‘nominee’ for the trust72 It was ‘impossible to dismiss’ such
representations ‘as not reflecting Ithe defendants9 relation to the trust’.73 Indeed, Mrs
Noble assumed that the money to pay for die shares would come from the trust. This,
apparend); further demonstrated that she ‘was not contemplating [the defendants] were
acting or should act outside the trust’74 but ‘clearly accepted [their] action as a trust ac/ion,
and the transaction and the proposed action as trust matIers’.7 The negotiations that led to
the purchase of the initial parcel of shares, moreover, could not be separated from the
negotiations for the second and third parcels.76
Although die trust could not, in the absence of a court order varying the terms vu the
trust. acquire any more shares beyond the 81)4)0 shares that were part of the residuary estate
and although the defendants had no mandate to carry out transactions for the trust, die
theory- seems to have been developed that die defendants could make recommendations
and had ‘authority to negotiate but not to bind the principal’.’’ This suggests that a
constructive trust gave the principal what had been negotiated on his behalf by his agent.
The case was therefore analogous to the numerous cases in which gain was, consistendy
with the fiduciary’s undertaking, deemed to have been acquired as agent of the principal and
therefore held for the benefit of the principal.78 Benson ,‘ J-lmt/ionz7t3 is illustrative. The
defendant Heathnrn was the director of a company established for the purpose of
purchasing, building and hiring our steam vessels. Knowing that a request to purchase a ship
suitable for carrying coals was imminent, Fleathorn purchased the ship Norma/ia/for £1310
before selling it to the company for £1500 a short time later. Heathorn was held
accountable for the £160 profit. I-Its actions ‘indelibly and inextricably fixed him with die
character of agent from the beginning of that transaction’ so that he ‘ought to be
considered as having purchased the ship “Normahal” for £1310, as the agent and on behalf
of the [companyl’.8°
7l 11)641 I \VI.R 993 (Cli) 1007.
72 Ibid 997—9&
73 Ibid I 01)8. 11w issue was considered central to the case be both iarties, such repcestnra:ions bring den:ed bs
the defendants: see amcr.ded statement of clam, IS July 1963, pan. 8; Re- amended De&nce of the First ad
Sc’,nd Defendants, It) Ntarth 1964, paras 9, 6.
N 119641 I WIR 993 (Ch) 997.
75 Ibid 11)1)7 (emphasis added). \\ illierfisree
.1 also concluded that Mr Fiix th’sught the defendants were
ci’nnnutng tu act for the trust: ibid I 008.
76 ‘the accepted offers for the first parcel were, uiila the 804)0 trust shares, used a-s leverage in later negnuadons.
Moreover, Fe defendants did not ‘throw is If their agency charac te r’ and B, sardman ‘ci snttnucd thri ughi ut Its
represent the eros t in his dealings with the directors’. ‘l’his made it ‘imps issiMe to separate the actisi tv of
Boardman and Ihipps in acquiring the shares from die rest of what they were doing’ for and on behalf of
the trust ibid 1012.
77 Submission of rounscl for the claimant before the Court of Appeal, suggesting the relationship ‘was more
like stsmerhthg of the estate agenn- nature’: 119651 Ch 992 (CA) 1009.
78 See eg. Lies,’ Noel.,!! 118291 I Russ & M 53,39 ER 21; affd 11834I 2 M & K 819,39 ER 1157; Betas,,
Heaehcrss 118421 V & CCC 326,62 ER 909; Thy/sri’ Salmon (1838)4 Mv & Cr 134.31 ER 53.
79 Heathnri: (n 78).
50 Ibid 311) (Knight fleece VO. Sec aiso Re Capt Bits,, Comasv:; (1585)29 Ch D 795 C.\ 803—1)6 (Cotton Ii),
SI) (FnLJ)
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A related point is raised elsewhere in the judgment of Wilberforce J with regard to the
negotiations for the shares during Phase 3. Dv thts stage it seems to have been accepted that
the defendants owed their duties directly tn the beneficiaries, who had become absolutely
entided to the shares under the trust following the death of Ethel Phipps in November193881 The claimant, Wilberforce J suggested, had lost the oppormnin’ to join the
defendants’ venture since information which showed that the risks of the venture were
limited and the projected profits sitmificant was not disclosed to him as it ought to have
been. The claimant was therefore justified in thinking that he had been duped, albeit
unintentionallv)2 into giving something away when ‘he did not consider he was giving
anything away’.81
(B) REMOVAL OF THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGENCY GAIN TRIGGER ON APPEAL
The case was viewed in very different terms in the appeals. Notably, agency played a
marginal role.54 Some, such as Lord and Russell U,86 eschewed an agency analysis
altogethet87 Others considered ‘agency’ was simply ‘a convenient way to describe’88 the
defendants. Lord Denntng, for instance, identified the defendants’ liability as a form of
stranger liability flowing from their assumption of authority to act for the trust when in fact
they had no such authotirt59 They were in essence agents do so’; tad and therefore agents as
much as trustees do son tad are express trustees. Agency language indicated that the
defendants owed fiduciary obligations to the trust but it was not the source of those
obligations. Nor did the employment of the term necessarily imply any other legal incident
commonly associated with the concept.
RI The point is dealt with most clearly by Lord Cohen: Il67l 2 AC 46 ([II.) 1114.
82 Iii iardman was acquitied ‘cndrelt of any intention El) deceive or suppress material information’ but had ‘failed
to appreciate the degree of explanation and the quantity if suppi tOng documents which would be needed to
etiah,le somet inc aiming fresh cci it . . . to app raise it. or even 0€ see that ins was a matter wli ich required
careh:l ctms,derani,n and pert advice: 11961) I \Vl.R 991 (Gb) 11)14.
Xl I hid It) 17. ill itrfi,rce J went on ci, cisnelede that full disc1’ so re should have been made to the cl;iimau t so
he ‘had the ipps ,rtuntfl if getung hts expe e t to look into it ft it him’. ‘A bile ii could ni it be said with certain n
what be wi nM have di ‘lie In tile cireums tance S ‘lie ought to base had the ippc irtuni tv and it could not ite
assumed that slime mutually acceptable arrangement Iwith the dcfendanrsl ui, Lild not have been reached’: ibid
1017.
84 ISv ihits stage of the hugani in even ci icinsel flit Ihie claimin I lea. peted dies cnn a egumni t, s::lanraing ib a,iii c defendants had ‘placed themselves in a special posit:i in, the nt.’rest eqohuksn to us’nJ is agcnc
‘ 119671 2 AC46 (ill.) 70 (empita sis added) - I :isr dc ratcd cons:deraeo n ci f ci :e a’e 0ev rcasi mm in &anb.,’.m, see C; II I.i:Odinan, ‘Lstalahishing Agcllcv’ (1968) 84 I.QR 221. 231—39.
85 19671 2 AC 46 (HI.) 118 (defendants plated ihemse Ives in a ‘special position which was if a fiduciary
character’ and were accountable for the profit made out of such special position).
86 119651 Gb 992 (C A) 1031 (fidoeiarv responsihcihines flciwecl from the defendants’ receipt of an ‘aspect’ of toot
pri mpcr:v cons ferred by die trustee’: In boar h if trust).
87 lord Upjohn was also explicit on this point, ni iting tile defendants ‘were never in fact agents: 119671 2 AC 16QII,) 126.
88 Ibid 11)3 (I.cird lit idsi iii). 1.1 ,rd Ci lien eliougl it the defendant, were agents’ ci f the trus tees but ackni iwleciged
that, unlike agents in an orthodox i ,r usual sense ts f the term, they had no power to affect legal tel:, tic ins
laces een the trustees and third parties and fi it this reasi in the arrangement with tile two active trustees was
sufficient us place them in a fiduciary pi mi tii in its the trust: ibid I 11*).
89 119651 Gb 992 (C.\) lOl7—l e also ibid IOu) (l’ears’in U). I.c,cd Denntng drew upon numerous ‘do son ton’
cases in which ciursiders to a particular relathinshmn were held accountable by virtue if assuming an auchiodrs
they did not possess: set e.g. Stws.csrch Cast (l53) 2 I ci’ 223, 74 F It 496 (executor do son to4 Rckhao, a’ Sod/c/I(1851)) I Mat & G 607, II FR 1400 (trustee ate son 1o4 Gaston and Lord Dunk Case (1590) I leo 220. 74 ER
21)1 (bailiff do so” to4 His Lordship drew fuether support from Lydia’ Kannody (1889) II App Gas 437 (iii.).Flincever, this case was determined by application tiC ordinary pnnciples of agency by ratification, the I louse
of Lords having fc,.rnd that the principal had ratified the defendant’s acts: ibid 454—56, 457,
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Moreover, having examined the undertakings of the defendants and the actions of the
trustees it vas accepted that at no point “-as responsibthtv assumed by the defendants to
negotiate on behalf of the trustY0 Viscount Dilhorne expressly rejected the apparent
assertion that the acquisition of the shares ‘vas a trust action1 while Lord Cohen could ‘not
understand why’ it had been said that the defendants “-crc making die initial offer as agents
fot die trustees’.92 That was inconsistent with die evidence. There simply was a ‘sound
business arrangement’ by which the defendants used the trust to extract useful information
to assist in their purchase of the shares while the trustees saw control of the company pass
to friendly hands and realised a profit without assuming the risk of loss.93 Flowever, the
defendants made a vital mistake. On the occasions they did represent die trust they obtained
information that “-as crucial in the negotiations for the shares and the opportunity to
purchase such shares- They used the same without the consent of the trust beneficiaries
(who were die principals following die death of Ethel Phipps) and were therefore
accountable. This, admittedly, “-as harsh on die defendants while the claimant was the
fortunate, even undeserving, recipient of an ‘unreasonably large amount’.94 However, this
was necessary in order to ‘do nothing to vhiiile away ... the absolute responsibility’ that
fiduciary duties impose.9’
7 ‘Property’ as the constructive trust trigger
The affirmation of die Order of \Vilberforcej in the appeals coupled with the undermining
of a possible agency gain foundation for the defendants’ constructive trusteeship might be
taken to suggest that the simple appearance of gain acquired hi breach of fiduciary
obligation was considered sufficient to trigger a constructive trust. However, information
acquired by Boardman and Tom Phipps and exploited when negotiating for the shares, as
well as the opportunity to obtain the shares, was characterised as trust property throughout
the litigation. This opens up the possibility that ‘property’ rather than the simple appearance
of fiduciary gain triggered the constructive trust. In Birksian terminology there “-as a ‘pre
existing proprietary base’, albeit an intanizible one. Is is, however, important to note that two
distinct apprnaches to property in information and oppormnin- were taken in &ardm:zn.
Only one of these approaches — the minorin approach — is consistent with a proprietary
base analysis.
(A) THE MINORITY APPROACH
A minotin of judges in Board;mm treated information acquired by Boardman as property of
the trust in the same sense as any other subject matter of a trust. Thus, Lord 1-lodson
dissented ‘from the view that information is of its nature something which is not properly
to be described as property’ and concluded that confidential information acquired by
9(1 thus, ii was pointed our that ISoardinan corrected Mrs Nobles misunderstanding that the trust as to fund
the purchase of the shares, that thereafter Mrs Nid,Ic acquiesced in die defendants’ plans and that Mr tnt,
ho would never have consented ins die acquisition of the shares for the trust, pnnsinvelv encouraged
Iksardmans actions: [19651 Ch 992 (CA) 1017 (turd Denning MIt), 119671 2 AC 46 (HI) 75—76,84 (Viscount
Ddluirnc), 06, I IX) (ti rd Cnshcn), 103—09 (lord Hudson).
91 [196’l 2 sc: 46(111.) 75—76.
92 Ibid9&
93 119651 Ch 992 (CA) 1012 (Pearson Lj See also 119671 2 SC 46 (IIIJ 117 (lord Guest.
94 119651 Ch 992 CA) 1031) (t’easnsn t.J). [19671 2 AC 46 (h-IL) 104 (Lord Cohen).
95 119671 2 AC 46 (HI.) 105 lh1ird Hnsdsi’n). Similarly, Russell U expressed sympathy for defendants whom he
cnansidcred vfcdms of pdnciples est equity whose diidstv is necessary if cases deserving nsf no sympathy are
not in) escape’: 119651 (,h 992 (CA) 1032.
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Boardman was ‘properly regarded as the property of the trust’.96 Similarly Lord Guest, who
did riot limit his observations to confidential information, saw ‘no reason why information
and k-novledge [acquired by Boardman from his position] cannot be trust property’.97 1-us
Lordship, moreover, charactetised the purchase of the shares as a transaction entered into
with trust property98 In effect, the defendants were viewed as having made a gain by
speculating with trust propern’. This suggests a constructive trust was viewed as vindicating
the trust’s ownership of the information by granting the same incidents of ownership in the
assets purchased through its exploitation.99
The reasoning of Lords 1-lodson and Guest reflects the majorin view on this point in
the Court of Appeal and follows the argument made by the claimant before the Flouse. The
claimant submitted there was a proptieran- link between information and oppormnirv
belonging to the trust and the shares purchased through their exploitation. Information and
oppormnin acquired by Boardman, either by reason of his agency or (following die
reasoning of Russell U in the Court of Appeal) by use of the trust shareholding, became
trust property and were held by the appellants as constructive rrusteesiW When such
information and opportunity were exploited to purchase the shares, the shares were likewise
‘held by [the defendantsl as constructive trustees for the beneficiaties under the Will’)°2
This property foundation was, from the beginning, set up as the stronger alternative to a
claim based on mere breach of fiduciary obligation)°3 The claimant’s case, Pearson Ij said
in the Court of Appeal, ‘is based solely on propern- tights’i°4
(B) THE MAJORITY APPROACH
This is nor how the majority of judges in Boardmsm conceived of property in information
and opporrunirt For the majotir; if information and opportunity were to be charactetised
as property at all it was for the limited purpose of denoting who, as between the trust and
the defendants, was entitled to their beneficial use. Ar trial Wilberforce J asked ‘whether the
knowledge of which profitable use was made can be descniedas the property of the trust’. ‘
I-us conclusion was that information “-as ‘essentially the properrv of the trust’ but only ‘so
far as the expression can be used’. 106 Crucial to the issue was R4’gaI (F-Ias/ings) i’ Gnus-er,107
which \Vilberftirce j read as providing a ‘positive answer’’8 to the question of whether
opporwnitvrelated information can be desctihed as ‘property’.
96 1196712 Ac 36(111.) 107.
97 tbid 115.
98 Ibid.
99 See e.g. .-l#sn:ej General s’ laü Lsk 119841 II <I It 275, 290 (suggesting 13srrdm,,s was a case involving the tracing
of trust lin)pcrtv C nverred to the defendants’ wn use).
1(10 119651 (Ii 992 ((A) 11)31. Russell Ij reasuned that one aspect of the trusts sliareluilding was the leverage it
gave ni ne ) tiatü ns and its potential use as a means of acquiring use lu) kn swlcdge about the eumpanv. This
‘aspect of trust pn spe rt’ ‘ was placed in the hands of the defendants in breach of trust ‘and must in those
hands have remained part if the trust assets’.
11)1 case 6 ir the respo ndenr, para 3 I, reasons 74.
11)2 Ibid reason 9.
103 Amended statement of claitn, IS July 1963, para 20.
104 119651 (h 992 ((h\) 1031.
105 1196411 \\l.R 993 (Cli) 11)11 (emphasis added). ‘[his is not necessarily the same as askmg whether nformannn
is pnsperev.
106 Ibid 1012 (emphasis added).
107 R4gaI(n 3))).
lOS 119641 I Wl.R 993 (c:h) ID! I.
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R4gaI makes no reference to ‘property’ in opporwntn’-rebted information. The liability
of the directors rested squarely on the no-profit rule: mfotmation about tile opportunity to
purchase shares in tile subsidiary came to the directors ‘by reason, and only by reason of
die fact that they were directors of Regal, and in the course of their execution of that
office’. W9 By exploiting the opportunin; the directors thus made a profit from their
fiduciary position and were, accnrdingh accountable. However, no liability attached to one
director, Gulliver, who did not personally exploit the information about the opportunity to
purchase die shares. Gulliver passed the information to third parties which, though donees
of the information, were free to exploit die information and to purchase die shares.1 10 The
opportunity-related information was therefore ‘propern” only to the extent that it denoted
enddement to its exclusive beneficial use as between the company and its directors. It did
nor denote entidement as between the company and die world at large.
This is how ‘propern” in information was understood in rLss ;‘ Ben/mm) II also relied
upon by \Vdberforce J. It is also how propern in opporwnin is understood in modern
corporate opporwni cases. Corporate opportunin is described as ‘property’ for the
purpose of excluding from its exploitation a director who resigns from the company to
which the opportunity is said to ‘belong’.’ 12 ‘Propert? expresses the idea that in the context
of the bi-partire relationship benveen former director and company the opportunity is the
company’s to exploit and the former director is excluded, notwithstanding that he no longer
owes die company fiduciary obligations.’’3 The fact that opportunity is charactensed as
propern for this purpose does not, however, necessarily imply any other incident
commonly associated with the beneficial ownership of a resource. For instance, opportunity
is not necessanly to be regarded as ‘propern’ for the purpose of generating liability to
knowing receipt since in this context the recognition of property in something as nebulous
as commercial opportunity mar nsk an over-extension of the personal liabilin’ of strangers
to fiduciary relationships and uncertainn in commercial dealings.1 II In [his context, at least,
‘property’ is understood as a contingent rather than a unitary concept. resource may be
property for one purpose but not another.
In the Court of Appeal in Boardman, bird Denning MR expressly adopted
\Vilberforcej’s conclusions on property in the opportunity-related information and, having
observed that knowledge acquired in furtherance of a fiduciary’s undertaking is ‘property’
in the sense that an employee invention is the property of his employer)1’ agreed that such
knowledge ‘could properly be described as “the property” of the trust.’ 16 Reference to
109 Resa/ (n 3))) 387 (lord Russell), See also bid 389, 391—92 (lord Macmillan), 393 (lord Wright), 395 (lord
l’isncr) Viscs ion t Sinker established liability to acci I OIl t hi’ application of the no conflict rule: ibid 38 1—82.
110 Ibid 382 (Viscount Sanke). 389—9 (I Al rd Russell).
II I S9I I 2 t. h 234 (LA:. ‘liw sspce t of his case dealing ‘a ith prtaperiv in nilirmat;’ ‘n is discussed ti derail in
13 Kcrsha’a; ‘l)i,c, it Niatter I lou the t.aw ‘thinks About Liirpsiraie Opporrunitirs? (21)1)3) 25 LS 532. 539—SI.
12 0)1 Doh,,s a Simcne: 12)8)21 IWC 600 (LIt) 96? (latritre Coi!sns j); Lpüacnw i’ Lsrofl Lid 12)8)11 L\X (:A
Liv 093 22j (Tucker [f).
113 Se e.g. Uhr.sfr.:o.? (UK) Lid F:ek/:r.7 120031 Lxxi ic 1638 (C h) 113331 where I.cuison 3 noted a pssstofflce
director ma, he liable for the diversi, in of a bus:ness cipportunin . . . nLvausc tIre business oppc,rr.mit itselt
is to be :rLn’cd is the property of the ctimpanv (in die scr.se of an intangible asset) and hence is :n.s:cd far tin
as trust property’ (emphasis added). See also C’! V Detlnn (n 112) 1951—1961: l/erm,is’a;n Lid a
120091 Ii\I IL 3694 (Cl,) II 4( (fudge David Dsinaldso n QL).
114 Cimmonsrs/th 01/ &Cas (o Lids’ B.rvter 120091 LSIFI 75 120101 Sc: 156 1161—1191 (bird I hamilton P) I°l—Il(Lord Nimmi, Smith). But cf OLI Dolphin (n 112)11 00J—[ 11)51.
115 I’ 9651 Lb 992 (CA) 101 8—i 9
116 Ibid 1019 ‘the use of parentheses (‘the property) suggests an acknowledgment of the peculiarity ,if
Wilberforce f’s finding of pniperev in the information, to which Lord Denning deferred and considered
‘decisive of the case.
r
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employee inventions is particularly instructive. Prior to Boardman, information comprising a
non-patented employee invention had been described on numerous occasions as ‘propern-’
held on trust for the emph vet) i7 l-tcwever, it was also accepted that this was ‘not a
perfectly accurate’ characterisanon smce the invention does ‘not have the character of
propern- such as one usually finds a trust attaching to’.’ Nevertheless, treating an
employee invention as trUSt property encapsulated the positive and negative obligations of
the employee to take whatever steps were necessary to place the invention at the disposal
of the employer and to exclude himself from its benefit)20
A majotin of the F-louse of Lords was explicit as to the qualified nature of the claimant’s
property rights in the information. Viscount Dilhorne, who considered tins ,‘ Benham!2I to
be a case which ‘thtows some light on this quesflon’,2 did not think the Phase 2
information ‘was propern’ of the trust in the same way as shares held by the trust were its
property’)23 Lord Cohen agreed that information is ‘not propern in the strict sense’)24 ‘In
general’, said Lord Upjohn in an oft-quoted passage. information is not propern’ at aU’. Even
confidential information, lie said, ‘is not propettv in any normal 55’i_
For the majority of judges in &nrdmzm. information was therefore ‘propetrv’, if at all, io
a limited sense. It was propern for the limited purpose of indicating that those mflng
fiduciary obligations to the trust were excluded from its exploitation but it did not indicate
a set of incidents more commonly associated with ‘propern-’. Nor did it imply that the
principal’s right to exclude was a right in rem. Rather it was in essence a tight in krsonam
exercisable against a person or a closed list of persons, being those o\1ng fiduciary
obligations to the trust.
8 Appropriation of ‘opportunity’ as the constructive trust trigger
If the above analyses are correct, then five of the seven judges finding for the claimant
arguably recognised that the presence of an additional element, beyond the mere acquisition
of gain in breach of fiduciary obligation, was necessary to trigger the constructive trust su
recognised. However, both Lotd Cohen and lord Denning MR undermined the agency
foundation of \Vtlberforce J and adopted a qualified ptopertv analysis that cannot be
understood as having provided an orthodox proprietary base. It may be that both of their
Lordships accepted that a simple bteach of fiduciary obligation was, without more,
sufficient to thgger a constructive trust of the shares. It certainly is possible to read the
speech of Lord Cohen and tile judtment of Lord Denning MR in this way I lowever, there
is nothing to indicate an intention of either to overrule fJsIer by a side wind, something
which would be necessary “-etc it to be accepted that a simple breach of fiduciary obligation
is sufficient to trigger a constructive trust. Moteover, tIle teasoning employed might be tend
as supporting a narrower constructive trust trigger.
t7 Bnasb Ce,nrsr LI,! r.tTh’”e,’[ Ii °l Lb .364 t A). See thu Srr.’:g Es:çthcen’g C r a,a*nt II °l - 334 liii.;
543—44 (V,sroi,n, S:rniinds) . 34? (lord Red); Vçkx SaO. Glass (S s- £rr,,i; II ( 211 (C h) 217—i S
(i:aei: I)
IFS ils’;cneff(n II?) 381 (lord Greene
ItO Ibid.
120 Ilaid. thus, ‘it is I, ,r the empisise r to say whether it shall be patented, and he can require thee mph nec to ds i
i hat is r.ecessarv to that enS: faa I-itt (n I I?) 341 (\‘isciaunt Sin,, ntis).
121 tie ‘Bcnbam(n II
122 119671 2 AC 46 (I IL) 90. .\Irliuugh lie did not refer to Au,’ &nL-am, the reasontng ‘if [‘‘rd C iihcn suggests a
iimilar understand,n,. ti F the nature tif thc ‘propern’ in question: ibid 100—1)3.
123 Ibid 89—94).
l2 Ibid 102.
123 Ibid 127—25.
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Lord Cohen, who had the casting vow in the F-louse of I,ords)26 placed great emphasis
on the fact that:
the company is a private company and not only the information but the
opporninity to purchase these shares came to them through the introduction
which Mr Fox gave them to the board of the company and In the second phase
when (lie discussions related to the proposed split-up of the company’s
undertakmg it was solely on behalf of the trustees that Mr Boardman was
purporting to negotiate with the board of the company)2
Responding to the argument that the defendants were not accountable since information
used in the purchase of the shares could never have been used for the same purpose by the
trust, Lord Cohen said that this thd not:
give due weight to the fact that the appellants obtained both the information
which satisfied them that the purchase of the shares would be a good investment
and the opporwnit of acquiring them as a result of acting for certain purposes
on behalf of the trustees ... (-(is liabiltn- to account must depend on the facts of
thc case. In the present case much of the information came the appellants’ way
when Mr. Boardman was acting on behalf of the trustees on the instructions of
Mr. Fox and the opporrunin- of bidding for the shares came because he
purported for all purposes except for making the bid to be acting on behalf of
the owners of the 8000 shares in the ctimpanr 28
lord Denning similarly charactedsed the present case as one in which a fiducian- had
acquired knowledge for the use of his principal but bad turned it to his own use.
Consequenth; Boardman had ‘gained an unlust benefit by the use of his principal’s
property’ (in the qualified sense).
This suggests the defendants’ constructive trusteeship may have been triggered not by
the mere acquisition of gain in breach of fiduciary obligation but by the defetidants’ misuse
of an opportunity or know(edge pursued or acquired on behalf of the claimant,
notwithstanding that such information or opportunin was not the prupern of the claimant
in an orthodox sense but only in some pecultar sense. Indeed, it “ill be recalled that
elements of the judiment of \Vilberfotcej appear to suggest that the claimant was viewed
as having been deptived of the opportunin to participate its the venture)29 Some support
for this interpretation can be found in the recenr case of Fl-fR Europea,: I nturcs Ui’ t
Slankanous. 131) In this case, Sir Terence Etherton C, having quoted from the speech of Lord
Cohen, placed Bonn/man in the second caregor of Lord Neuberger’s Sine! sir categotisation
of cases in which fiduciary gain triggers a constructive trust)31 As such, it was a case in
which ‘the benefit has been obtained by the fiduciary by taking advantage of on opportunity
which was properly that of the ptincipal’. 132
12(1 lord (id;cn had tetired as a I ird sf .\ppval in Ordinar c in 1960 but rononud 0 Sit fl thc lhiza-e by
invitation. In &rnlmae which u-as his last case, ‘his tier r(lCagtes being cqaiiv d:vided, it fell to him. much
to his anxiet’-. give the casting deosii In’: R \\ dix rfi ‘etc ‘Cs hen. I ii intl i eisna:d Baron t [II leo ( i 368—I 973)
in OafsnI Datonar, of Xoiicstil fl:r.0y (:evd onhnc edo 2tH)4.
127 1i967l 2 .u: 46 (I-IL) iOI.
128 (hid 102—01
29 See above nn Bi—83 and arcolnpans.ing text.
130 120131 L\VC:\ Civ 17, 120i31 3 All ER 29 1891—1961.
31 See Son/air (0 49) 1881—1891. the categories identified were: (I) ‘the asset or money is sir has becn beneficially
the property of the beneficiary’; and (2) the fiduciary ‘arquited the asset or inssncy hy taking advantage of an
sippormnicv (It right u-Inch u-as properly that of the beneficiary’. In all ether cases the claimant is lsmitrd to a
personal claim (sir the value (If the gain derived by the fiduciary from the breach of fiducian obhgansin.
132 FHR E:smpeass I basins (n 130)1831. 1’l-
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9 Conclusion
The House of Lords printed case papers shed considerable light on the issue of proprietary
relief in Boc,rdmeru z’ P/uftps and lead to a significant re-evaluation of this aspect of the case.
We now know that: (1) a proprietary constructive trust of the shares was recognised in the
Order of \‘(ilberforcej and affirmed by the Court of .\ppeal and by a majority of the House
of Lords; (2) in the end, the claimant did not seek to have the shares transferred to bun but
rather sought payment of the value of flve-eighteenrhs of the net gain that the defendants
derived from the purchase of the shares; and (3). arguabh; the recognition of a constructive
trust was a live issue since it facilitated recovery by allowing the claimant ro capture profit
s
some or all of which he could not othenvise have captured had his claim tested directly on
a breach of fiduciary obligation. These three findings explain why both the language
of
constructive trusteeship and the language of accountabiin- for net profits run throughout
the case. The claimant wanted the net profits but their recovery \vas premised, at least in part,
on the recognition of a proprietary constructive trust of the shares.
It is, however, more difficult to pin down the precise event that triggered the
constructive trust on which the claimant’s recovery rested. Of the seven judges that found
for the claimant four (Lords 1-lodson and Guest and Pearson and Russell IjJ) appear to
have adopted approaches consistent with the view that a construcnve trust of the shares
simply vindicated a pre-existing and continuing proprietary interest of tile claimant. While
Lord Neuberger did not appear to appreciate this in iindair, straining as lie did to explain
aivay Boardman on other grounds)-’ the judgments of a majonty of those finding for John
Phipps are (at least in form)134 cunsistent with his Lordship’s caregodsation of cases in
which fiduciary gain triggers a constructive trust. \\hether the notion of an intangib
le
proprietary base should play a role in the future classification of the cases is, however,
doubtful. First, the majorin- view on the ‘prupertr’ issue in Bean/wan, which included three
of their Lordslups. was inconsistent with an intangible propnerarv base analysis. Secondh
;
the approach is inconsistent with the modern consensus against deducing outcomes by
classifying a resource, particularly an intangible resource, as properttl3i Thirdly, in this
context ‘propern-’ is a slippery concept with a low predictive yield; it is likely to generate
uncertainty rather than ciarinJ-
133 3 (ne/air (n 19).
134 Ui imp ,rran t n Irma tire distincto in is rha r in t! ie pripe rrt cacs char a ire! Neuhcrger
had in mind the
fiduciars s acts rcm wed value from the principal and channcllcd it, via tlic hands of a third parry.
nto the
fiduciarys (ia-n hands: see Re Cserphilly Us/lie0- Usmpver (Pnrrmsr Crse,l (Ii??) 5 Ch L) 336 ((A); Re Cnn/em
OilhIerA Csrpnr.ann i tLzy (lfr, Cite) (1874_75j Ii) (Ii App 595 ç(A) (nor circe! by lord NeuIscr.er but cited
in argument by counsel). In such cases tb.c fiduciar ‘s raking if gain undermines he oIicctivcs cii the fiduciary
relation ship in a way In winch ac quisinve I ircacl cs if fiduciary obhgano n iliac cause ns i ci irrelate
toss ci, the
principal di, not.
35 Ilius. it is now accepted rliar whether an intangible is pri pen’ for a given pnrpiisc is a n
indusiim (liar
depends to a significant degree (in context, ‘(lie important issue is nor whether a resource is or has been
labelled ‘prupern but rise purpose fir e hich it is or has been so labelled. (in tIns functi, mal v:ew a resource
may be propern-’ for one purpi (Sc l,ut ni it another. -or illustrarii iris see U/tr4r see (UK) Ut? i’ FIc/thng 120031
LA%i II. 1638 (Os) 113731_I 3871 (I ewicon j) (discussing and illustrating this point with reference to hiccnccs);
Crqy v Yeas Creesp Neaççen Ut? 12(1111 L\ I_IC 349 tCh;, 12(1111 2 \VLR 145)1 çThs (it is someumes
convenIent to regard acrinns brough: io prorect comniercraliv eonfidersr:al inflirmacon . . . as
rnrelleemai
propern claims. ‘Iliat does not mean tHey ujIl be regarded as such fir all purposes); l’bthss s Ntis-s Crimp
Xen.rprn U? 120121 UKSC 28, 120151 I AC I 1201 (Lord \Xhlker) (confidential inflirniadon may be
:are}lccwal pnspern ‘ far ihe purpi sseo F the Senior Cisuris icr 1981. s 72, even though in gencral it is not
p rope rn in a stnet sense).
1.36 See A Flicks, Constructive [rusts of Fiduciary Gain: laster Revived? 120111 Cone 62, 67—68.
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\Vilberforce j, on die other hand, appeared to view the negotiations for die shares as
trust actions. The recognition of a constructive trust was thus presented in a manner that
was consistent vitli a line of cases in which the fiduciary’s gain was, in line with his
undertaking to further a patticular objective of his principal, deemed to have been acquired
for his principal in furtherance of that objective. This would have provided an
uncontroversial foundation for the constructive trust in &arth;,an were it not for the fact
that this aspect of the analysis of \Vilberfotce j was inconsistent with die evidence and
tightly undermined in the appeals.
The approaches of Lord Cohen and Lord Denning MR are less clear in terms of the
foundations on which they rested the constructive trust. By rejecting die foundations of the
agency and property approaches, both approached the matter in a manner that was more
consistent with the recognition of the principle that a mere breach of fiduciary obligation
is sufflcient to trIgger a constructive trust. However, die speech of Lord Cohen and die
judgment of Lord Denning should, nevertheless, be interpreted more restrictively
‘Property’, albeit in some imprecise and qualified sense, was always in the background and
both thought the claimant had been deprived of an opportunitY or benefit or ‘property’ of
some kind. A restrictive interpretation would also avoid the disservice of attributing to nvo
eminent equity judges die recognition of a constructive trust, without discussion of die
point or consideration of die relevant authorities, on grounds that ‘vere controversial if not
impossible to square with existing principle. The problem ‘vidi resrricnng proprietary relief
by reference ro die concept of ‘opportunity’, however, is that (like ‘prupertv’) it involves a
degree of artifice and is somewhat uncertain.1’
In the end analysis, Boardman was a case with peculiar facts that was pleaded in a peculiar
vay’38 This, it seems, led to the recognition of divergent (though equally peculiar)
constructive trust triggers, none of which were entirely satisfactory: l’erhaps more
importantly, although there was no consensus as to the cotistructive trust taigget in
Baardman, the above analysis makes it possible to identih what did not trigger die
constructive trust: a mere breach of fiduciary obligation. .\!ong with Krcvh :Saon9brd IS) and
Tyrell z’ Bank of London)40 Boardman has been taken by some to form a spine of autliotin;
extending over three centuries, which supports the principle that tlac mere acquisition of
gait’. in bteach of fiduciary obligation thggets a construcnve trust.141 The present article
completes the removal of die whole of that spine.t42
137 Fl IR Eanspes:s; t nturn (n 13(1) ll (lihertlin C).
138 It is important not to underestimate the impact sf the written and oral arguments of counsel on udicial
reasoning: see R B uxtrin, ‘III 1W the 0 Immon law Gets Made: F ledley Byrne and Other C:auti, nary Tales’
(2009) (25 I.QR 60.
139 (i26) SI [as CIa Ui. 25 LIt 223.
1411 (i862j IohlLc:as26, ii ER 931 (IlL).
141 Se e.g. Real (o 41) 332,338; Lord T’crer Nldlctt. ‘Bribes and Saer Contm:ssio,is Again’ P012l ClJ 583,
605-Il.
142 As to Ksrth see A Hicks, ‘The Remedial Principle ,f Keel vsa4srdRrrnnszderrrf 20101 CU 287. As us
see P itrs, ‘l)mll v Bassk of lrds,s — An Inside Junk at in tnside Job’ (2013) 121) I.QK 526, especially the
forceful critique of Lord Peter Mullen’s analysis of T5rnllat 552—51,.
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